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MISSION AND SCOPE:  
 
The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center (IATPC) was established in 1990 
in the Food and Resource Economics Department (FRED) of the Institute of Food and 
Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of Florida. Its mission is to provide 
information, education, and research directed to immediate and long-term enhancement 
and sustainability of international trade and natural resource use. Its scope includes not 
only trade and related policy issues, but also agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, 





 The Center’s objectives are to: 
 
•  Serve as a university-wide focal point and resource base for research on 
international agricultural trade and trade policy issues 
•  Facilitate dissemination of agricultural trade related research results and 
publications 
•  Encourage interaction between researchers, business and industry groups, 
state and federal agencies, and policymakers in the examination and 
discussion of agricultural trade policy questions 
•  Provide support to initiatives that enable a better understanding of trade and 
policy issues that impact the competitiveness of Florida and southeastern 
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Abstract: This research estimates price and expenditure elasticities of U.S. red wine 
imports from five countries--Italy, France, Spain, Australia, and Chile—which are 
compared to elasticities of domestically produced red wine using the first-difference 
version of the almost ideal demand system (AIDS). Expenditure elasticity results indicate 
that if U.S. total expenditures on red wine increase, domestic producers would gain most. 
Empirical results for conditional own-price elasticities of demand indicate that U.S. and 
Chilean red wines are elastic while U.S. demand for red wines from other countries are 
highly inelastic.  Due to the magnitude of consumption of U.S. domestic red wines 
relative to imports, an increase in the price of U.S. wine results in a decline in quantity 
demanded that is six times larger than that for French and Italian red wines and over 20 
times larger than that of other import countries.  Results suggest that U.S. red-wine 
producers could increase their total revenue by decreasing prices, while Italian and 
French producers can increase total revenues by increasing prices. 
 




IMPORTS VERSUS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION: 
A DEMAND SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. RED WINE MARKET 
 
Introduction 
The overall goal of this research is to estimate U.S. demand for red wine in order to 
obtain price and expenditure elasticities using a difference version of the almost ideal 
demand system (AIDS).  This analysis examines both import demand as well as demand 
for domestically produced red wines. U.S. imports of red wines increased over 330 
percent in the last decade, and red wines account for 56 percent of total wine imports by 
quantity (U.S. Department of Commerce-Bureau of the Census). Despite its importance, 
few studies were identified in the literature that examine U.S. wine trade and, more 
specifically, U.S. import demand for red wine.  This research seeks to fill this void by 
estimating demand elasticities for U.S. red wine imports and assessing the impacts of 
these imports on consumption of domestically produced red wines. 
Trends in the U.S. Wine Industry 
In 1997, total U.S. wine production was 17.6 million hectoliters, had a 
corresponding value of 19 billion dollars (Wine Institute), and accounted for almost 8% 
of total U.S. agricultural output (USDA-FAS).  The value of U.S. wine production 
increased dramatically in the last decade due to considerable improvement in overall 
quality, product refinement, and an appreciation of American wines by consumers (Wine 
Institute).   
Additionally, the U.S. is the second largest importer of wine in the world by value 
(Figure 1; FAO).  U.S wine imports increased 200% between 1989 and 1998 (USDA-




Commerce-Bureau of the Census).  In 1998, wine imports totaled 1.9 billion dollars, for a 
total volume of 4.1 million hectoliters, and were 5% of total U.S. agricultural imports 
(USDA-FATUS).  Additionally, U.S. wine imports equal 23% of total U.S. wine 
consumption (Wine Institute), and red wine imports account for 56% of total U.S. wine 
imports by quantity.  This compares to 35% for white wines and 9% for sparkling wines 
(U.S. Department of Commerce-Bureau of the Census).  Since red wines constitute the 
majority of wine imports, this research focuses on red wines. 
Tremendous growth in U.S. red wine imports has occurred.  Total U.S. imports of 
red wines increased 350% in terms of value and 330% in terms of quantity in the period 
1989-1998 (U.S. Department of Commerce-Bureau of the Census). In 1998, the U.S. 
imported 1.9 million hectoliters of red wines, valued at 848 million dollars.  Italy, France, 
Spain, Australia and Chile are the major red wine exporters to the United States.  These 














Figure 1.  Wine Imports by Country, 1997 
Source:  Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, 1998. 
 
 
more than 92% by quantity in 1997 (U.S. Department of Commerce-Bureau of the 
Census).  Italy and France are the dominant red wine exporters to the United States, and 
they accounted for 78% of total U.S. red wine imports by value and 64% by quantity 
(Figure 2). 
Although all five red wine-exporting countries increased their export quantity to 
the U.S., Australian and Chilean red wines experienced the most dramatic growth (Figure 
3).  Italy increased red wine exports to the U.S. nearly four times between 1989 and 1998, 
















































Figure 2.  U.S. Red Wine Imports by Country, 1997  
         (Total quantity equals 186,168,000 HL) 
 





Figure 3.  U.S Red Wine Imports by Selected Countries, 1989-1998 















































While consumption of red wine imports is significant, U.S. consumption of 
domestically produced red wines greatly exceeds total import consumption. In 1999, the 
share of domestic red wines consumed relative to total U.S. consumption of red wines 
was 63% while that of French, Italian, Spanish, Australian, Chilean, and the rest-of-world 
(ROW) was 14%, 11%, 2%, 5%, 3%, and 2%, respectively.   
Data 
Data on U.S. red wine imports from Italy, France, Spain, Australia, Chile, and the 
ROW were obtained from the U.S Department of Commerce-Bureau of the Census.   
Monthly import data from April 1990 to August 1999 of the “International Harmonized 
System of Commodity Classification” (HTSUSA) are used in this analysis, and the 
sample size includes 113 observations. The quantity of imports from each country is 
measured in liters, and the value of imports is defined as cost insurance freight (CIF) 
prices plus import taxes.  Unit prices of imported red wine from each country are imputed 
or derived by dividing total value by total quantity of imports from the above data. 
Domestic data were much more difficult to obtain.  Although the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) collects domestic data on grapes, it does not collect similar 
statistics for wine.  As wine is an alcohol, wine data are collected by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) within the U.S. Department of Treasury.  Monthly 
domestic consumption of wine is calculated using data from ATF’s “Monthly Statistical 
Reports—Wine,” where domestic consumption equals taxable withdrawals (production) 
minus exports minus the change in stocks, and the monthly proportion of red wines 
consumed is calculated using consumption shares obtained from The U.S. Wine Market 




obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and it includes monthly price indices 
from December 1983 through December 2000.  A price estimate for red wines in the year 
2000 was obtained from Gomberg-Fredrikson based on AC Nielsen scanner data, which 
allows us to convert the BLS monthly price indices into actual prices.  A summary of 
descriptive statistics is presented in Table 1. 
AIDS and Time-Series Data 
Deaton and Muelbauer developed a flexible-functional-form demand system from 
a PIGLOG expenditure or cost function.  It is almost ideal, in their opinion, because it 
provides an arbitrary first-order approximation of any demand system, it provides perfect 
aggregation over consumers without maintaining homothetic preferences, its functional 
form is consistent with known household-budget data, it satisfies the axioms of choice 
exactly, it allows statistical testing of homogeneity and symmetry, and its linear 
approximation is simple to estimate (Deaton and Muelbauer).  One of its serious 
limitations is that no restrictions on its parameters can insure negativity or concavity of 
the cost function.   
In the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), the log of a price index, derived 
analytically from the AIDS’ cost function, deflates the log of (nominal) income. In 
practice, Deaton and Muelbauer recommend replacing the analytically derived log of the 
price index with an approximation, the Stone index, that is, 
(1)  ∑ = =
n
i i i p w P
1 ln * ln  
where wi  ) / ( x q p i i =  is the budget share of good i (=1, …., n),  ∑ =
i i iq p x is (nominal) 
expenditure or income, pi is the price of good i, qi is the quantity of good i, and n is the  




This approximation is not without its problems.  Unless preferences are 
homothetic (unitary elasticities), the Stone index, even with constant prices, can vary 
because expenditure shares vary with income levels.  Other deficiencies of this 
approximation exist including that simultaneity is introduced by the dependent variables 
entering into the Stone index (Eales and Unnevehr) and that parameter estimates are not 
invariant to the units of measure (Moshini). 
Fortunately, in the time-series case, an alternative exists, the first-difference 
AIDS,
1 that is, 
(2)  jt j ij
t
t
i it p d
P
x








= ln ln * * γ β  
where d represents the first difference of a variable, dln P
** is the first difference of the 
analytically derived log-price index, t (=1,…,T) represents the time period, and  i β  and  
ij γ are parameters assumed to be constant.  In principle, equation (2) is estimable, but, in 
practice, Deaton and Muelbauer suggest replacing dln P
** with
 either the first difference 
of the Stone index or the Divisia price index, 
(3)  ∑ = =
n
i it it t p d w P d
1 ln ln , 
where  2 / ) ( 1 , − + = t i it it w w w is the average budget share between time t and t-1.
2  Unlike 
the Stone index, the Divisia price index in (3) does not vary with constant prices even if 
income changes and preferences are non-homothetic.  Further, parameter estimates based 
on the first-difference version of AIDS utilizing the Divisia price index are invariant to 
                                                 
1 Deaton and Muelbauer coined this name for the first differencing of the AIDS.  The model itself without 
first differencing was named by them as the “levels version.”  We adhere to this terminology throughout 
the paper.  




units of measure, and there is no simultaneity problem as in the levels version.  A careful 
reading of Deaton and Muelbauer suggests that the first-difference version fit their data 
better than the levels approximation in terms of homogeneity and symmetry restrictions.
3 
Empirical Estimation 
The system we estimate is conditional on U.S. expenditure on red wines, both 
domestically produced and imported.  To make the estimation manageable, we follow the 
multi-stage budgeting approach as described by Barten (1977) and used, for example, by 
Seale, Sparks, and Buxton. Specifically, we maintain that U.S. consumers allocate total 
expenditure among groups of goods, red wine being one of those groups.
4  Preferences 
among these groups are blockwise dependent (Theil) or weakly separable (Barten 1977).  
Having allocated expenditure for the group, red wines, U.S. consumers further allocate 
red-wine expenditure among U.S. domestically produced and imported red wines.  By 
including U.S. red wines with imports, we follow the argument by Winters that domestic 
and imported goods of the same type may not be additively separable or preference 
independent. 
Deaton and Muelbaurer fit the first-difference version of AIDS to British time-
series data and introduced intercept terms to allow for time trends in the levels version.  
Similarly, we allow for monthly-time trends in the levels version by introducing 12 
monthly-dummy variables in the difference version.  Because the model is fit to monthly 
instead of annual data and to deseasonalize the data, we twelfth difference the data such 
that dln zt = ln zt – ln zt-12 where z represents w, q, p, or x (Kmenta, pp. 325-326).  
                                                 
3 Eales and Unnevehr and Kastens and Brester fit the first-difference version with the Divisia price index as 
suggested by Deaton and Muelbauer. 
4 One of the other groups could be white wines and, based on blockwise dependence, the marginal utility of 




Specifically, we estimate the following twelfth-difference system, combining equations 
(2) and (3),  
(4)     it t it jt g j ij
gt
gt
i it d p d
P
x









= ∑ ∑ ∈ ln ln
* , 
where g represent the group, in this case red wines, d represents a (twelfth) change in a 
variable, xg  ) ( ∑ ∈ =
g i i iq p is the expenditure on red wines from countries i∈ g (= Italy, 
France, Spain, Australia, Chile, U.S., or ROW),  pi and qi are the price and quantity of red 
wines from countries i,  g i i W w w /
* =  is the (conditional) budget share of red wines from 
imported or domestic sources where wi ) / ( x q p i i =  and  x q p W
g i i i g / ∑ ∈ = , 




∈ ∑  is the (conditional) Divisia price index where 
() ww w it it i t
**
,
* / =+ −1 2 , dit is a dummy variable for the i
th good in the t
th month, εi  is the 
residual term for the i
th good with zero mean, and ε (=εi ,…, εn ) has covariance equal to 
Ω.  If vt is the original error term for time t in the levels versions, then εit = νit – νi,t-12.  If 
νt is autoregressive with νt-12 (i.e., νit= τ νi,t-12 + ζit), then εit is autoregressive (Kmenta, p. 
321-322). 
The adding-up conditions,  
(5) 
0 = ∑i i β , ∑∑ =
ij ij d 0, and ∑ =
i ij 0 γ ,  
are met automatically because  dwi i
* ∑ = 0, and, accordingly, the full n x n covariance 
matrix is singular.  Under this condition, Barten (1969) shows that the system parameters 
can be estimated by dropping one equation and that these estimates are invariant to the 




  Homogeneity can be imposed on the system by constraining ∑ ∈ =
g j ij 0 γ  and 
symmetry by constraining  ji ij γ γ =   ∀ i,j g ∈ .  Economic theory suggests that these 
conditions should be maintained, but it has become common practice to test for these 
restrictions (e.g., Deaton and Muelbauer; Laitinen; Meisner).   
Testing Restrictions 
 
The model of equation (4) is estimated in three ways: without homogeneity or 
symmetry (unrestricted), with homogeneity imposed, and with homogeneity and 
symmetry jointly imposed.  We also test each of the above estimations for autocorrelation 
of the form  it t i it ξ ρε ε + = −1 ,  where  it ξ ~N(0,Σξ). To preserve adding up, we constrain 
ρ to be the same across all equations (Berndt and Savin).  
With autocorrelation, iterative seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) is not 
maximum likelihood because the log of  the Jacobian term of the likelihood function is 
not equal to zero.   Accordingly, we fit the model to the monthly data under the different 
restrictions using the maximum-likelihood scoring method with and without 
autocorrelation of degree one (AR(1)).  See Seale, Walker, and Kim for a thorough 
treatment and discussion of the scoring method when allowing for autoregressive errors 
of degree one.   
Concentrated log-likelihood values from the different estimations are presented in 
Table 2.  The values in the parentheses represent the number of restrictions going from 
the previous model to the next more restricted one.  For example, imposing homogeneity 
on the unrestricted model necessitates 6 restrictions and imposing symmetry on the 
homogeneity-constrained model necessitates 15 further restrictions.  Column (2) of table 




constrained to equal zero, and column (3) of the table presents the concentrated log-
likelihood values when ρ is not constrained to equal zero.     
  We use likelihood ratio (LR) tests to statistically determine whether or not the 
restrictions above should be imposed on the model.  These LR tests are easily calculated 
based on the information reported in table 2.  The test statistic is 
2
q χ  where q is the 
number of restrictions, and it is equal to the negative of 2(Lr-Lu) where Lr and Lu are the 
log-likelihood values for the restricted and unrestricted models, respectively (Kmenta, p. 
491).
5  For example, a test of AR(1) versus no AR(1) is 
2
1 χ  that, at the 95% confidence 
 
Table 2.  Concentrated Log-likelihood Values from Twelfth-Difference AIDS 








unrestricted 2701.04  2705.00 
homogeneity 2694.13  (6)








2613.36 (60)  2630.37 (60) 
aAR(1) respresents autocorrelation of degree one. 
bNumbers in parentheses represent the number of restrictions from previous model. 
 
 
level, has a critical value of 3.84 (Johnston, p. 427).  When making row comparisons 
between the values in column (2) and (3), the constraint that ρ = 0 is rejected in all cases.  
                                                 
5 The test is invariant as to whether one uses the log value of the concentrated-likelihood or the 




Accordingly, correcting for AR(1) is necessary to ensure that the asymptotic standard 
errors are consistent.
6   
  Concentrating on the model corrected for AR(1), homogeneity is not rejected at 
the 95% confidence level by the LR test when comparing the concentrated log-likelihood 
values of the homogeneity-constrained model and the unrestricted one. To test for 
symmetry, we compare the concentrated log-likelihood values of the symmetry-and- 
homogeneity constrained model with that of the homogeneity-constrained one.  Again, 
we do not reject symmetry at the 95% confidence level.  We also test whether it is 
appropriate to constrain the monthly dummy parameters to be the same in each equation 
and reject these restrictions at the 95% confidence level.  
Parameter estimates 
 
Based on the LR test results above, we do not reject homogeneity, symmetry, or 
AR(1) although we do reject the hypothesis that the monthly-dummy parameters are the 
same in each equation.  Accordingly, all reported parameter and elasticity estimates are 
based on the AR(1) corrected model with homogeneity and symmetry imposed and 
allowing the monthly-dummy parameters to differ among equations.  Estimated 
expenditure parameters, price parameters, the AR(1) parameter, and their associated 
asymptotic standard errors (within parentheses) are reported in Table 3.  We estimate the 
model with maximum likelihood using the scoring method dropping the ROW equation 
due to the singularity of the full-covariance matrix.  The parameter estimates of the ROW 
equation and their associated asymptotic standard errors are calculated based on the 
                                                 
6 Without correcting for AR(1), the asymptotic standard errors are inconsistent, and any statistical tests 




adding-up restrictions.  Parameter estimates are used to calculate elasticity measures as 
discussed below and presented in tables 4 and 5. 
  All expenditure parameters, βi, are significant at the 95% confidence level and are 
reported in column (9) of table 3.  The βi for imported red wines are all negative while 
that of the U.S. is positive.  As we shall see below, this means that imported red wines are 
conditionally expenditure inelastic while U.S. domestic red wines are conditionally 
expenditure elastic; none are conditionally unitary elastic.  
Conditional own-price parameters are reported along the diagonal of columns (2)-
(8) of table 3.  Four (Italy, France, Chile, and U.S.) are statistically different from zero at 
the 95% confidence level, two (Spain and Australia) are statistically different from zero 
at the 90% confidence level, and that of ROW is statistically zero.  All are positive except 
that of Chilean red wines.   
Conditional cross-price parameters are reported as the non-diagonal elements of 
columns (2)-(8) of table 3.  Of the 21 conditional cross-price parameters, seven are 
statistically different from zero at the 95% confidence level, and five others are 
statistically different from zero at the 90% confidence level.  Twelve are negative while 
the others are positive.  It is also of interest that all price parameters of U.S. domestic red 
wines are significantly different from zero at the 95% or 90% confidence levels. The 
autocorrelation parameter, ρ, is equal to .17 with an asymptotic standard error of .04 





Table 3.  Conditional Parameter Estimates from Twelfth-Difference AIDS for U.S.  





  γij    βi 
Countries Italy  France  Spain  Australia Chile  U.S.
b ROW
c   Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    (9) 
            
Italy  .088 -.044 .006 .000 .004 -.060 .005    -.054 
 (.017)
d (.012) (.003) (.005) (.006) (.025) (.003)   (.012) 
             
France    .107 -.004 -.002 -.005 -.049 -.003   -.056 
    (.017) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.027) (.003)   (.017) 
             
Spain     .003  .001  .000  -.004  -.002    -.007 
      (.002) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.003)   (.002) 
             
Australia      .009  .004  -.013  .001    -.024 
      (.005)  (.005)  (.007)  (.003)    (.003) 
             
Chile      -.021  .019  -.002    -.021 
       (.008)  (.009)  (.003)    (.004) 
             
U.S.        .112  -.004    .172 
        (.055)  (.002)    (.030) 
             
ROW         .005    -.010 
         (.007)    (.003) 
             
aAR(1) is autocorrelation of degree one.  The estimated estimate of this parameter, ρ, is .17 
with an asymptotic standard error of .04. 
bU.S. represents United States. 
cROW represents rest-of-world. 
d Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Conditional Expenditure Elasticities and Marginal Shares 
Conditional expenditure elasticities are calculated as ηi = 1 + βi/wi
* (Chalfant; 
Alston, Foster and Green).  If βi is significantly different from zero and positive 
(negative), the conditional expenditure elasticity is elastic (inelastic); if βi equals zero, the 




change in quantity demanded for red wines when total U.S. expenditure on red wines 
increases by 1%. 
  Conditional expenditure elasticities, reported in column (2) of table 4, are 
calculated base on the average (conditional) expenditure shares for the red wines in 1999.  
All are positive but only that of the U.S. is greater than one (1.3); those of the imported 
red wines are .4 (Chile and ROW), .5 (Italy and Australia), and .6 (France and Spain).  
These results indicate that if total U.S. expenditure on red wines increase 1%, the 
quantity demanded for U.S. red wines will increase more than 1% while that of imported 
country-specific red wines will increase less than 1%. 
  Marginal shares equal βi + wi
*  and  are calculated based on the average 
(conditional) expenditure shares for the red wines in 1999 and are reported in column (3) 
of table 4.  Marginal shares indicate how an additional dollar spent on red wines would 
be allocated.  U.S. domestic wines would benefit the most with 80 cents of the additional 
dollar being spent on them.  Eight cents and six cents of the additional dollar would be 
allocated to French and Italian wines, respectively, while two cents of the additional 
dollar would be spent on Australian red wines and only a penny each on  Spanish, 
Chilean, and ROW red wines.  Thus, the U.S. red wine industry would be by far the 










Table 4.  Conditional Expenditure Elasticities, Marginal Shares, and Own-Price 






Marginal shares Own-price elasticities 
 






Italy  .52  .06 -.10  -.27 
France  .60  .08 -.09  -.31 
Spain  .60  .01 -.78    -.80 
Australia  .50  .02    -.77   -.84 
Chile  .40  .01     -1.56   -1.61 
United States  1.27  .80 -.19   -1.63 
Rest of world  .44  .01 -.69  -.72 
 
Conditional Own-Price Elasticities 
Several price elasticity formulas have appeared in the literature for the AIDS 
(Alston, Foster and Green), and we use those suggested by Chalfant.  The conditional 
















i =− + + 1
γ
β * . 
Conditional Slutsky and Cournot own-price elasticities are calculated based on the 




columns (4) and (5) of table 4, respectively.  Slutsky price elasticities are compensated 
while Cournot price elasticities are uncompensated.  According, Cournot own-price 
elasticities are larger in absolute value than Slutsky ones because Cournot elasticities 
measure pure substitution effects (as do Slutsky elasticities) plus income effects of price 
changes. 
  All conditional own-price elasticities are negative.  Slutsky and Cournot own-
price elasticities of demand for Chilean red wine are conditionally elastic while the 
conditional Slutsky (Cournot) own-price elasticity of demand for U.S. red wines is highly 
inelastic (elastic); the conditional Slutsky (Cournot) own-price elasticity of demand for 
U.S. red wines is -.2 (-1.6) and that for Chilean wines –1.6 (-1.6). The difference in the 
U.S. conditional Slutsky and Cournot own-price elasticities reflects the expenditure 
sensitivity of demand for U.S. domestic red wines. 
Italian and French wines are much less own-price elastic.  This indicates that U.S. 
consumers’ demand for Italian and French wines are not that sensitive to own-price 
changes.  Conditional Slutsky (Cournot) own-price elasticities are only -.1 (-.3) for 
French and Italian red wines.  The conditional own-price elasticities of the other wines 
are more elastic than French and Italian red wines but less elastic than Chilean red wines.  
Australian red wines have a conditional Slutsky (Cournot) own-price elasticity of -.77 (-
.84), Spanish red wines of -.78 (-.80) , and that of the ROW red wine is -.69 (-.72). 
  These results suggest significantly different effects from price changes on U.S. 
red wine demand.  If the price of French and Italian red wines increase by 1%, 
uncompensated quantity demanded for these wines will decrease only about .3%.  U.S. 




1% increase in U.S. and Chilean red wine own-prices would decrease the uncompensated 
quantity demanded for these wines by about 1.6%.   
 
Conditional cross-price elasticities 
 
Conditional cross-price elasticities measure the effect on the quantity demanded 
of a good when the price of a substitute or complimentary good changes.  Again, we 
choose the formulas for calculation as suggested by Chalfont.  Specifically, the Slutsky 
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*  ,  j i ≠ . 
These elasticities are calculated based on the average (conditional) expenditure shares for 
the red wines in 1999 and are reported in table 5.   The conditional Slutsky cross-price 
elasticities are reported in the top matrix of the table, and the conditional Cournot cross-
price elasticities in the bottom matrix.  A positive Slutsky cross-price elasticity indicates 
that an increase (decrease) in the i
th good’s price will cause the quantity demanded of the 
j
th good to increase (decrease), that is, the goods are substitutes (complements). Of the 42 
conditional Slutsky cross-price elasticities, 33 are positive, and nine are negative. 
Australian and U.S. red wines are the only ones that are substitutes for all wines. 







Table 5.  Conditional Cross-Price Elasticities of United States Demand for Red 





















Italy ---  -.25  .07  .05  .07  .10  .06 
France -.20  ---  -.01 .03  .00  .27  .00 
Spain .45  -.11  --- .10 .05  .04  -.13 
Australia  .12 .10 .04  ---  .12  .36 .04 
Chile .22  .00  .03  .17 ---  1.17  -.03 
U.S. .02  .06  .01  .03  .06  ---  .01 
ROW .41  -.03  -.12  .10  -.06  .40  --- 
 Cournot 
Italy  --- -.46 .04  -.02  .02 -.86 .04 
France -.38  ---  -.04 -.04 -.06  -.73  -.03 
Spain .27  -.33  ---  .03  .00  -.60  -.16 
Australia -.05 -.11  .01  ---  .07  -.59  .01 
Chile .06  -.19  .00  .11  ---  .28  -.06 
U.S. -.24  -.26  -.03  -.08  -.01  --  -.03 
ROW .24  -.23  -.15  .03  -.11  -.51  --- 
aU.S. represents United States. 
bROW represents rest-of-world. 
 
demanded for all other red wines; a 1% increase in the price of U.S. domestic red wines 
will increase the (compensated) quantity demanded for the other wines by less than .1%.   
However, the price changes of the imported red wines have more positive effects on the 
quantity demanded of U.S. domestic red wines.  This is particularly true for a price  
increase of Chilean red wines.  A 1% increase in the price of Chilean red wines will 
increase the (compensated) quantity demanded for U.S. red wines by approximately 
1.2%.   A 1% increase in the price of Australian and ROW red wines will increase the 
(compensated) quantity demanded for U.S. red wines by approximately .4% while a 1% 
increase in the prices of French, Spanish, and Italian red wines will increase the 




.1%, respectively. Another interesting finding is that French and Italian red wines are 
complementary as are French and Spanish red wines. 
  One of the more interesting findings concerning the Cournot cross-price 
elasticities and reported in the bottom matrix of table 5 is that when the income effect of 
a price change is taken into account in addition to the pure substitution effect, an increase 
in the U.S. price of domestic red wines decreases the demand for all other red wines.  
Additionally, except in the case of Chilean red wines, increases in the prices of imported 
red wines decrease the quantity demanded for U.S. domestic red wines.  For example, a 
1% increase in the price of Italian (French) red wines will decrease the (uncompensated) 
quantity demanded of U.S. domestic red wines by approximately .9% (.7%), respectively.  
A 1% increase in the price of Spanish or Australian red wines will decrease the 
(uncompensated) quantity demanded for U.S. domestic red wines by approximately .6%, 
while a 1% increase in the price of ROW red wines will decrease the quantity demanded 
for U.S. domestic red wines by about .5%.  In the case of Chilean red wines, a 1% 
increase in price will increase the (uncompensated) quantity demanded of U.S. domestic 
red wines about .3%, indicating that U.S. consumers would prefer to switch to 
domestically produced red wines rather than pay higher prices for Chilean red wines. 
Conclusions 
Key finding of this research include the following.  Firstly, although the volume 
of imports has dramatically increased in the past decade, U.S. consumption of 
domestically produced red wines far exceeds that of imports.  Secondly, expenditure 
elasticities of U.S. imported red wines are all inelastic.  In contrast to this, the 




implies that if U.S. total expenditure on red wines were to increase, U.S. demand for 
domestic red wines would increase more than the demand for red-wine imports.  This 
would certainly benefit the U.S. red wine industry.  However, increases in total U.S. 
expenditures for red wines stem from non-price demand determinants such as rising 
incomes, changing demographics, or changes in preferences and may be beyond the 
influence of the U.S. wine industry.  One possible avenue of influence may be through 
specific label or generic advertising. 
 Thirdly,  the  conditional  own-price Cournot elasticities of U.S. and Chilean red 
wines are elastic but inelastic for all other country wines.   Thus, if U.S. producers 
increase the price of their red wines, U.S. consumers are price sensitive (when income 
effects are considered) and will decrease their consumption of domestic red wines by a 
greater percent than the price increase.  Because of this, total revenue to U.S. red-wine 
producers will fall if price rises, and this would be harmful to the U.S. red-wine industry. 
  Fourthly, the conditional own-price elasticities (Cournot and Slutsky) for Italian 
and French red wines are strongly inelastic relative to Spanish and Australian red wines.  
This combined with the fact that Italian and French red wines dominate U.S. red-wine 
imports, comprising 78% of the total red-wine imports, gives red-wine producers from 
these countries a competitive advantage.  Thus, Italian and French red-wine producers 
could increase their prices with little impact on the quantity demanded for their wines and 
thereby increase their revenue. 
  Fifthly, regarding conditional Slutsky (compensated) cross-price elasticities, U.S. 
and Australian wines are substitutes for red wines from other countries.  Additionally, a 




for red wines.  However, a 1% increase in the price of imported red wines does increase 
the demand for domestically produced red wine, with Chilean wines having the most 
dramatic impact. 
  Finally, when comparing own- and cross-price elasticities, results indicate that an 
increase in the price of U.S. red wines will reduce compensated demand by only .19 
(Slutsky), but, when income effects are considered (Cournot), a 1% increase in the price 
of U.S. red wines leads to a 1.6% reduction in its quantity demanded.  This decline is six 
times greater than the decline for Italian and French red wines and over 20 times greater 
than that of any other country-specific wines. 
The bottom-line implications are that U.S. red-wine producers are able to increase 
their total revenues by decreasing price because their own-price elasticity of demand 
(Cournot) is elastic.  In contrast, Italian and French red-wine producers could increase 
their total revenue by increasing prices because of the highly inelastic nature of demand 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Consumption of Red Wine by Source, April 1990 - August 1999.
 Italy  France  Spain  Australia  Chile  Rest of Worl
Price (USD per Liter)             
Mean $3.43  $6.49  $4.38  $4.88  $2.48  $2.77
median 3.35  6.31  4.26  4.72  2.46  2.73
minimum 2.76  4.74  2.58  3.98  2.06  1.93
maximum 4.88  10.89  6.39  7.26  3.10  4.60
coefficient of variation  12.10  16.64  18.22  12.88  9.01  18.34
 
Import Values (000 USD) 
          
Mean $14,150  $20,021  $1,813  $3,254  $3,603  $2,103
median 12,652  17,629  1,561  2,088  2,767  1,903
minimum 5,312  6,441  338  281  442  326 
maximum 32,891  49,705  5,000  12,994  8,752  4,707




          
Mean 40,288  30,719  3,939  6,268  14,214  7,510
median 38,921  28,237  3,593  4,920  11,676  6,661
minimum 16,723  12,438  1,036  455  1,932  1,382
maximum 80,182  73,624  10,312  21,705  35,556  15,657
coefficient of variation  36.60  40.03  46.34  82.37  65.17  44.54
 
Expenditure Shares 
          
Mean 0.1185  0.1684  0.0143  0.0231  0.0265  0.0172
median 0.1100  0.1600  0.0100  0.0200  0.0300  0.0200
minimum 0.0700  0.1000  0.0100  0.0000  0.0100  0.0100
maximum 0.2200    0.2800  0.0400  0.0700  0.0700  0.0300
coefficient of variation  27.16  25.42  39.62  64.40  46.30  29.39
 